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CASE COMMENTS

Sibes v. Johnson, 16 Mass. 388 (1820); Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126
W. Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944). This doctrine has been modified
in some states by statute. Under West Virginia's parental liability
statute, liability is limited (1) to the parent or parents (2) in an
amount not to exceed three hundred dollars (3) of a child under
eighteen years of age (4) who is living with the parent or parents
(5) at the time he commits a wilful and malicious act (6) which
results in property damage. W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 7A, §§ 1,2
(Michie 1961). The Code further states that this statutory remedy
is in addition to any common law remedy already existing. A perusal
of this statute clearly shows that parental liability for personal injuries is excluded from its scope and common law still governs such
liability.
There are three situations at common law whereby a parent
may be liable for the torts of his child. These could be termed the
exceptions to the general rule of no parental liability. The first class
of cases deals with the situation in which the child is acting as a
servant or agent of the parent. In such cases, the doctrine of respondeat superior is sufficient to impose liability upon the parent,
and liability does not rest upon the parent-child relationship. Hower
v. Ulrich, 156 Pa. 410, 27 Adt. 37 (1893); Trahan v. Smith, 239
S.W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). The general rules of agency
govern this class of cases.
The second exception to the general rule is the situation wherein
the parent furnishes or turns over to his child a chattel which, in
view of the child's immaturity, is likely to be so used that it will
cause harm to others. Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103,
160 N.E. 334 (1928); Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29
S.E.2d 12 (1944); Gerlat v. Christianson, 108 N.W.2d 194 (Wis.
1961). The liability of the parent arises from his active misconduct.
He has actually created an unreasonable risk to others by placing
a chattel in the hands of a person whose use thereof is likely to
create a recognizable risk to third persons. However, it must be
shown that the proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of
the parent in entrusting such chattel to his child, and that an injurious result was foreseeable. Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349,
194 Pac. 356 (1920); Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161
S.E. 665 (1931).
In Mazzocchi v. Seay, supra, the court held that the complaint
stated a cause of action where it was alleged that the parent was
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negligent in permitting his child of tender years to possess an air
rifle, the indiscriminate use of which caused injury to the minor
plaintiff. The theory of this action was that the parent knew, or
should have known, that the air rifle would be a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of his minor child. The court further stated
that since the liability of the parent is grounded upon his own
culpability, negligence must be construed as a relative term and duty
dependent upon the circumstances. This reasoning was applied in
Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E.2d 694 (1950),
wherein the court held the parent not liable where he gave his son
an air rifle and the child was mature enough to control it.
The first two exceptions are not necessarily founded upon the
parent-child relationship. However, the third exception, with which
the principal case deals, necessarily arises from such relationship.
The relationship of parent and minor child affords a sufficient basis
for the affirmative duty on the part of the parent to exercise his
parental control. His liability may arise out of the failure to perform
definite acts to prevent the child from intentionally harming others
when he knows, or has reason to know, of the necessity for exercising such control and has the ability to do so. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 316 (1934). However, mere knowledge by a parent of a child's
mischievous and reckless or vicious disposition is not of itself sufficient to impose liability upon the parent. Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa.
350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281
Pac. 991 (1929). Liability rests upon the subsequent failure by
the parent to restrain or correct the child, where he knows the
child is likely to cause injury to others. Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d
641 (D. Idaho 1930); Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518,
293 N.Y.S. 147 (1937); Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L. R. 214
(1911).
In Ryley v. Lafferty, supra, the court held that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action. It alleged that defendant's son, age
sixteen, had the habit of beating smaller boys; defendant knew of
his son's vicious disposition; and defendant did nothing to admonish the son or to prevent further tortious conduct. Defendant's
lack of affirmative action was held to constitute participation and
assent by the parent. Similarly, in Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash.
241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929), the parent had knowledge of his minor
child's propensity to beat other minors with sticks, and when injury
occurred, the parent was held responsible. The parent had not furn-
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ished the child with the stick; the child was not acting as a servant
or agent for the parent; and the parent did not actively participate
in the child's misconduct. Liability was imposed because the parent
had failed to exercise reasonable care to correct the child's dangerous
propensities. The same result was also reached in Ellis v. D'Angelo,
116 Cal. App. 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953). In this case a babysitter was injured by the child, the parent having failed to warn
the plaintiff of the child's dangerous habits. But see Bowen v.
Mewborn, 218 N.C. 423, 11 S.E.2d 372 (1940), wherein the court
held that the complaint did not state a cause of action since it did
not allege that the parent's action or inaction was the proximate
cause of the injury occasioned by his minor child. For a collection
of cases on this subject, see Annot., 155 A.L.R. 85 (1945).
It is apparent that the courts are struggling to find the appropriate basis for liability. In many cases the parent is connected
with the tort of the child through his knowledge of the latter's propensities, thus constituting "acquiescence" or "consent." Norton v.
Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929); Thibodeau v. Cheff,
24 Ont. L. R. 214 (1911). This is an attempt to hold the parent
by forcing the case within either the rule that an actor who in any
way participates is a party to the wrong, or that the "consent"
constitutes an authorization to the child to act in behalf of the parent.
However, the real basis for liability is that the parent has failed
to exercise the care which a reasonable parent should exercise to
prevent his child from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to
third persons. None of these cases suggest that a parent may be
liable for his failure to so rear and train his child as to make him
amenable to discipline, for this would be placing a legal standard
upon an intangible family right. The issue of negligence must be
focused upon a particular failure of the parent to adopt reasonable
measures to prevent a definite type of harmful conduct on the part
of the child. Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct
of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886, 893 (1934).
The third exception to the general rule is similar to the "vicious
animal" doctrine. This doctrine, stated simply, is that the owner
of an animal will be held liable if the animal injures a party if the
owner knows of its vicious propensities and if his failure to restrain
the animal is the proximate cause of the injury. Butts v. Houston,
76 W. Va. 604, 86 S.E. 473 (1915); Johnson v. Mack Mfg. Co.,
65 W. Va. 544, 64 S.E. 841 (1909); 1 M.J. Animals § 20 (1948).
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However, this analogy cannot successfully be asserted because an
animal can be chained or fenced in, whereas a human is not amenable to such measures. Parents cannot be held to the degree of
liability of one harboring a vicious dog after notice of its viciousness.
Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929) (dictum).
Therefore, the ultimate issue will resolve itself into the question
of whether the parent exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.
West Virginia has not been confronted with the issue presented in the principal case. However, due to the enactment
of the parental liability statute dealing with the malicious destruction of property by minors, it appears that the trend in West
Virginia is toward placing more responsibility upon the parent.
W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 7A, §§ 1,2 (Michie 1961). Therefore,
a complaint similar to the one in the case at bar would probably
be upheld as stating a cause of action. As a practical matter, proving
that the parent took no reasonable measures to restrain the child,
knowing of his dangerous or vicious propensities, would present a
difficult evidentiary problem. Cases seem to indicate that admonishment by the parent would relieve him of liability if such were a
reasonable means of parental authority. Acts of incorrigible children
are not subject to the rule propounded by the principal case, for
no amount of parental discipline would be effective.
David Mayer Katz
ABSTRACTS
Federal Courts-Three Judge Court and Pre-emption
The Georgia legislature enacted a statute requiring that tobacco
sold at auction within that state be identified by tag according to
type. Operators of the tobacco warehouses brought action in the
federal district court to restrain state officials from enforcing the
act, ofn the basis that federal legislation had pre-empted the field.
A three-judge court was convened and granted the requested relief.
On direct appeal to the United State Supreme Court, held, affirmed
on the merits with no discussion of the propriety of the use of a
three-judge court. Campbell v. Hussy, 82 Sup. Ct. 327 (1961).
It is surprising that neither the Court nor the parties questioned
the convening of a three-judge court on the matter. In Ex Parte
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